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Resumen: En este artículo se propone un marco teórico para estudiar el 
comportamiento judicial en relación a la cuestión militar, tanto desde una perspectiva 
legal como política. La investigación centra la atención en la jurisprudencia sobre el 
alcance de la jurisdicción militar de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN) de 
México entre los años 1917 y 2012. Este tema es relativamente limitado, pero constituye 
una ventana privilegiada para observar la naturaleza dual (legal y política) de la SCJN, 
dado que captura las respuestas legales ofrecidas ante una materia altamente política, así 
como los modos en los que el diseño constitucional de las instituciones judiciales ha 
afectado la jurisprudencia de esta Corte. Se argumenta que el papel de la SCJN en 
relación al tema analizado se divide en tres períodos marcados por importantes cambios 
en los roles constitucionales y políticos de la justicia, y que éstos conducen a tres 
respuestas diferentes a la cuestión legal del alcance adecuado de la jurisdicción militar. 
Basado en el análisis legal y político, se argumenta que de 1917 a 1934 los jueces de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación jugaron un rol de árbitros; de 1934 a 1994 de 
partidarios del régimen; y de 1994 a 2012 jugaron en gran medida el rol de intérpretes de 
la Constitución en la cuestión de la jurisdicción militar.  
Palabras clave: teoría constitucional, jueces constitucionales, judicial politics, relaciones 




Abstract: We propose a theoretical framework based on the concept of role that 
enables analyses of judicial behavior from the legal and political perspectives 
simultaneously. We focus on the Mexican Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the scope 
of the military jurisdiction from 1917 to 2012. This topic is a relatively small but 
privileged window from which to observe the dual legal/political nature of the Supreme 
Court because it captures the legal responses that it has given on a highly political 
question, as well as the ways in which the constitutional design of judicial institutions 
has affected the court’s jurisprudence. We argue that our account is divided into three 
broad periods marked by important changes in the Justices’ constitutional and political 
roles that lead to three different responses to the legal question regarding the proper 
scope of the military jurisdiction. Based on the legal and political analysis, we argue that 
from 1917 to 1934 the Supreme Court Justices’ played the role of adjudicators; from 
1934 to 1994 they played the role of regime supporters; and from 1994 to 2012 they 
largely played the role of constitutional interpreters in the question of military 
jurisdiction. 
Key words: constitutional theory, constitutional adjudication, judicial politics, civil-






















The last decade has seen an important increase in the number of scholars and studies 
interested in the Mexican Supreme Court. Moreover, in contrast to a not very distant 
past, these studies come from diverse disciplines in the social sciences and not almost 
exclusively from the legal scholarship. For starters, there are now a series of richly 
descriptive empirical studies that unveil important issues and processes such as how the 
Justices are elected and how they decide cases (Elizondo and Magaloni 2010), how many 
and what type of cases the Supreme Court decides (Bustillos 2009a),1 and how many and 
what type of cases the Supreme Court decides through specific instruments of 
constitutional review such as the action of constitutionality (López-Ayllón and Valladares 
2009), and the constitutional controversy (Hernández 2011).   
There are also a series of political science studies aimed at explaining the behavior of the 
Supreme Court judges that emphasize the effects of different kinds of non-legal 
constraints on the Justice’s decisions. In this vein, for instance, it has been shown that 
Supreme Court judges began leveling the electoral playing field soon after the 1994 
reform (Finkel 2003), that divided government in 1997 increased the likelihood of 
decisions against the PRI (Ríos-Figueroa 2007), and that party turnover in the executive 
power in 2000 also increased the likelihood of decisions of unconstitutionality (Sánchez 
et al. 2011). It has also been shown that since 1995 the Supreme Court actively seeks the 
support of public opinion in order to build its power and authority to increment the 
likelihood of compliance with its decisions (Staton 2004, 2010). Perhaps the central 
lesson of this scholarship is that the Supreme Court is a sophisticated (i.e., strategic) 
political actor that has concentrated its efforts on arbitrating political conflicts 
downplaying its role as protector of fundamental rights (Ansolabehere 2010; Sánchez et 
al. 2011; Helmke and Rios-Figueroa 2011). 
In part as a response to the shortcomings of political science work on the Supreme 
Court, and in part because of the increasing importance of the Court’s jurisprudence for 
policies and politics, legal scholars have begun to produce systematic jurisprudential lines 
                                                        
1 The Mexican Supreme Court itself has produced a database of its decisions that is accessible through the 























on specific topics. This novel (for Mexico) work has produced specialized jurisprudential 
knowledge in areas such as criminal due process rights (Magaloni and Ibarra 2008), the 
taxing capacity of the state and the just imposition of fiscal burdens (Elizondo and Pérez 
de Acha 2006), federalism (Caballero 2013), separation of powers (Carbonell and Salazar 
2006: ch. 6), the scope and limits of sexual and reproductive freedom (Madrazo and Vela 
2011), and other theoretical analysis such as whether the Supreme Court uses a gender 
perspective when deciding certain civil matters (Pou 2010). In terms of judicial behavior, 
perhaps the central lesson of these studies is that the Court is building quite slowly, and 
in disparate and not always consistent ways, its understanding on the basic rules of the 
political game and on the effective protection of fundamental rights.2  
In sum, scholarship on the Mexican Supreme Court has made considerable progress in 
the last two decades.3  However, while we now have social science and legal analyses on 
the Court these two perspectives remain isolated. Because the Supreme Court is a key 
legal and political actor, we believe that it has to be analyzed from these two perspectives 
simultaneously. Moreover, we believe that each of these perspectives tends to embrace a 
misleading assumption that needs to be abandoned to account for the evolution and the 
determinants of judicial behavior in Mexico.  
On the one hand, while most social science studies on the Supreme Court focuses on the 
last two decades it is important to recognize that the Court has always been a key actor in 
Mexico’s political life, and that its role has changed through time and across issues.4  
Moreover, to understand the changing roles of the Court it is crucial to analyze its 
decisions and legal responses to specific political problems, something that social science 
studies usually don’t do in depth. 
                                                        
2 An underlying, and not always explicit, explanation for the unsteady and incoherent jurisprudential 
construction is the traditional legal training, and socially conservative ideology of some of the Justices. 
Sánchez et al. (2011) show some evidence on the existence of these two dimensions, traditional legal 
training and conservative ideology, based on the frequency of voting coalitions in non-unanimous Supreme 
Court decisions. 
3 For a review on socio-legal scholarship on Mexico, including the Supreme Court and other topics see 
Rios-Figueroa (2012). 
4 As several authors have argued understanding the role the Supreme Court played during the PRI era is 
fundamental not only for historical reasons, but also because without it one can hardly understand the 
structure of central judicial instruments as the amparo and the legal paradigm that still shapes the 






















On the other hand, contrary to what an important part of the legal scholarship implies, it 
is important to recognize that the decisions of the Supreme Court are often influenced by 
extra-legal factors and that these can be systematically accounted for. In this paper we 
argue that the Justices are motivated both by their constitutional and by their political 
roles. Because they are neither the Montesquieuan “mouth of the law”, nor purely 
Maquiavelian power seekers, we need a theoretical framework that enables an account 
that combines the political and legal perspectives.  
We propose a theoretical framework that enables analyses of judicial behavior from these 
two perspectives simultaneously. This theoretical framework is grounded on the concept 
of role. Our empirical research has a diachronic structure, which is characteristic of 
jurisprudential lines (López Medina 2009) and also particularly fruitful to show the 
interaction of political and legal aspects of judicial behavior. We focus on a single issue: 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the scope of the military jurisdiction from 1917 to 
2012. As we will show, this is a relatively small but privileged window from which to 
observe the dual legal/political nature of the Supreme Court because it captures the legal 
responses that it has given on a highly political question, as well as the ways in which the 
constitutional design of judicial institutions has affected the court’s jurisprudence.  
Our account is divided into three broad periods marked by important changes in the 
Justices’ constitutional and political roles that lead to three different responses to the 
legal question regarding the proper scope of the military jurisdiction. The three periods 
are:  
1) From 1917 to 1934: In this period the Supreme Court Justices’ constitutional and 
political roles were largely those of adjudicators, and therefore, their jurisprudence 
regarding military jurisdiction basically applied the quite restrictive scope established in 
Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution.  
2) From 1934 to 1994: In this period the Justices’ constitutional and political roles 
were those of regime supporters and their jurisprudence regarding military jurisdiction 
upheld the wider scope established in the Code of Military Justice over the narrower 
scope established in constitutional Article 13, protecting in this way the interests of the 





















3) From 1994 to 2012: In this period the constitutional and political roles of the 
Supreme Court Justices have had important transformations enabling them to function at 
times as constitutional interpreters, in the question of military jurisdiction. On military 
jurisdiction, this role crystalized with the jurisprudence starting in 2009. 
The reminder of the paper is divided into five parts. In the first, we discuss the concepts 
of roles (constitutional and political) and we give a brief introduction to the issue of 
military jurisdiction. The second, third, and fourth parts deal with each one of the three 
periods we have just described. In particular in each part, we first present the 
constitutional and political roles of the Supreme Court in order to then discuss its 
jurisprudence on the scope of the military jurisdiction. The fifth part briefly concludes.  
II. Roles and the Military Jurisdiction 
This section has two objectives. Frist, we give a theoretical account of the notion of role, 
and in particular of constitutional and political roles. Then, we give a brief introduction 
to the military jurisdiction question. In the following section we give empirical content to 
this theoretical framework. In particular, we present in detail the Supreme Court Justices’ 
role in each of the three periods we have identified, and its correspondent behavior vis-à-
vis the military jurisdiction (i.e. its jurisprudence in these cases).  
II. 1. “Roles” 
The notion of role is fundamental in many disciplines from linguistics to computer 
science, from cognitive to social sciences. In particular, several notions of “judicial roles” 
have been used in legal and social science studies on courts.  Broadly speaking, we can 
differentiate two different conceptualizations of “judicial role”. The first one, manly used 
in social science studies, refers to the Court’s function or task in a particular political 
system or in a particular time such as during a democratic transition (e.g. Kapiszwewski 
et al 2013; Ginsburg 2012). Under this notion the collective agent who plays the “role” is 
the Court. This notion is helpful to describe how the Court as an institutional agent 
interacts with other institutional agents such as the Executive and the Legislative powers, 





















juncture. This notion is therefore often used as the dependent variable in studies that aim 
to explain why a given Court played such and such function in a certain period. Often 
this conceptualization is loosely used and not explicitly and analytically defined. While 
helpful it presents some theoretical problems due to the collective agency it presupposes 
and to the functional ex post accounts that enables.  
The second notion of judicial role is refers to the self-conception of individual judges 
own task, i.e. the beliefs judges have over their function. This notion is often used as an 
independent variable to give account of judicial decisions (e.g. Hilbink 2007). This 
conceptualization can of course also be used as the dependent variables in historical 
studies that ask “why judges conceive their function as they do?”, or simply “how 
specific justices conceive their own task?” (e.g. Pozas-Loyo 2012b). This notion is also 
helpful but it has problems such as establishing a clear method to capture these often 
elusive self-conceptions, as well as other difficulties common to ideational accounts in 
general.   
The conceptualization of “role” we use here shares the usefulness of the other two 
notions but it also evades some of their problems. In particular, it has an explicit and 
analytically clear definition, the agents who play the roles are individuals, and the full 
description of roles is provided by norms that are common knowledge in the political 
context analyzed (Pozas-Loyo 2012). While this paper is merely descriptive, it is 
important to note that this notion of role can be used as independent variable in 
explanatory studies. Let us then now present the conceptualization of role we use.  
The central characteristic of roles is that agents or objects can play them.   “Role” can 
broadly be defined as an abstract description of an agent’s or object’s expected function 
(Zambonelli et al. 2003, see Masolo et al. 2004) due to its position in a set of relations (see 
Davis and Barret 2002). The main feature of roles is therefore, that roles are different 
from their players. The following three features of the relation between roles and their 
incumbents are important for our account:  
a) An entity can play different roles at the same time.  
In this way an individual can be a Supreme Court Justice, a member of a hegemonic 





















understand the ways in which roles can motivate individuals, and give shape to their 
behaviors, since the motivations of a given role, say the constitutional role of Supreme 
Court Justice, can be either trumped or reinforced by the motivations of another role, say 
the political role of member of a hegemonic party (see Pozas-Loyo 2012).  
b) Roles have a relational nature  
Roles are not essential properties; they are relational phenomena. In other words they are 
phenomena that emerge from relations. Hence, roles imply patterns of relationships 
(Boella et.al. 2006: 5). The powers of the individuals who play roles are not a property of 
those individuals, they are powers that derive from the specific set of relations that 
individual acquires when invested with the corresponding role. For instance, Justice José 
Ramón Cossío’s power to vote on the constitutionality of a law is not a property intrinsic 
to José Ramón Cossío as an individual, but dependent and posterior to his playing the 
role of member of the Mexican Supreme Court. 
c) Roles do not depend on their specific players 
Roles can be played by different entities at the same time (e.g. member of parliament) or 
consecutively (e.g. president of the US) (see Marsolo et.al. 2004). While they do need a 
player to be expressed, they do not need any specific player. This characteristic fits nicely 
with the impersonality of institutions and constitutionalism, and therefore is one of the 
reasons they are wonderful categories to account for institutions, social, legal and 
political, and their influence on behavior. 
II. 2. Constitutional and political roles: a definition 
Political and constitutional roles are part of a subtype of roles called “statuses”. A status 
is a role that carries prohibitions, rights and permissions (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 19). 
The complete description of an individual status function is the set of powers, 
prohibitions, rights and permissions the specific status function has (Searle 2010: 102). 
For instance, the set of powers, prohibitions, permissions, and requirements Supreme 





















being a member of the Mexican Supreme Court. This description is given by the deontic 
powers contained in the Mexican Constitution and in unwritten political norms.  
It is important to note that this notion of Supreme Court Justice role or status function 
should be divided into its constituent parts, that is the constitutional role on the one 
hand and the political role on the other. This analytic separation makes sense since the 
deontic powers of these roles can oppose or reinforce each other and therefore 
separating them would enable us to account for the de jure-de facto interaction and its 
consequence for constitutional efficacy (see Pozas-Loyo 2012). Note that even if the 
constitutional and political roles are separated their deontic powers are not likely to be 
fully consistent since constitutional and political norms are far from being free of 
contradictions.  
We can now provide clear definitions of constitutional and political roles. “A 
constitutional role is a status function whose complete description can be obtained by 
the organic provisions of a given codified constitution” (Pozas-Loyo 2012: 42). In the 
instance that concerns us here, the complete set of powers, requirements, prohibitions, 
and permissions that the Mexican Constitution grants to the Supreme Court Justices. A 
political role is the status function whose complete description can be obtained in the 
unwritten norms of the political system. For instance, as we will discuss in detail later, the 
expected political and constitutional functions that Supreme Court Justices played after 
the constitutional amendments of 1928, 1934, and 1944 qua participants of the 
hegemonic party system during the PRI era, can be broadly characterized as that of regime 
supporters and its full descriptions were contained in the Constitutional text and in the 
regime’s unwritten norms.  
II. 3. Military Jurisdiction 
The military jurisdiction, fuero militar in Spanish, has traditionally been justified on the 
grounds that members of the Armed Forces require a separate body of law, prosecutors, 
and courts that take into account the specifics of their job in order to give institutional 
stability and legal security to its members. Even though this justification has merit, in 
places with a history of military interventions, military participation in public security 





















impunity and arbitrariness. In particular, military jurisdiction became a blank check for 
members of the armed forces who committed crimes that had nothing to do with their 
specialized mission and a vehicle for repressing political opponents. In those places, 
members of the armed forces and executives got used to a very wide scope of military 
jurisdiction and usually resist attempts to reduce it, judicially or otherwise. As we will see, 
Mexico is not an exemption. 
In this paper, we focus on the scope of the military jurisdiction that is essentially an 
answer to the question: who can be judged in military courts, and under what 
circumstances?5  Judicial answers can be placed, in general terms, within seven categories 
ordered from the widest to the narrowest scope of military jurisdiction: (i) military 
personnel and civilians, under any circumstance; (ii) military personnel and civilians, only 
during emergency situations; (iii) only military personnel, under any circumstance; (iv) 
only military personnel, only when crimes were committed during service; (v) only 
military personnel, only when strictly military crimes are involved; (vi) not even the 
military personnel when crimes against humanity and human rights violations are 
involved; (vii) nobody never, that is the military jurisdiction is abolished.6  
Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 establishes and delimits military 
jurisdiction. It clearly states that:  
Article 13.- […] The military jurisdiction will deal with military crimes and offenses to the 
military discipline. The military tribunals never, and for no reason, will extend their 
jurisdiction to persons that do not belong to the armed forces. When a civilian is 
involved in a military crime or an offense to the military discipline the case will be 
decided in the correspondent ordinary court (emphasis added). 
                                                        
5 This is the kind of factual question requiring a legal answer that Diego López Medina (2009: 154) calls a 
“constitutional scenario”. 
6 While the extreme situations are theoretical possibilities that don’t take place as such in reality, there are 
actual cases that are closer to those extremes. For instance, Chile under the military regime expanded the 
scope of the military jurisdiction to include many ordinary crimes (Bovino 1998). On the other end, there 
are cases such as Costa Rica where the army itself was abolished, and also cases like France or Germany 
that have disappeared the military jurisdiction within their borders and accepted it only in cases of war 
abroad or aboard military ships (Pedroza 2011). Notice that in the intermediate categories where only 
military personnel can appear before military courts the difference is that in (iii) any type of crime, as long 
as it was committed by a member of the armed forces, is admitted in military courts; in (iv) only service-
related crimes are admitted thus limiting not the type of crimes but the circumstance under which they take 






















It is apparent that the scope of the military jurisdiction is defined very narrowly in the 
Constitution. During the debates of the constituent assembly in 1916 some deputies even 
proposed to eliminate the military jurisdiction altogether (González Oropeza 2006: 190). 
Article 13 remains the same today as it was in 1917, which makes it one of the few 
relevant articles that have not been changed in the more than four hundred amendments 
that the constitution has suffered. However, whereas Article 13 has remained constant 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the scope of military jurisdiction has fluctuated in 
important ways. 
Figure 1 shows a summary of the jurisprudential lines on military jurisdiction in Mexico, 
according to the previous seven responses. There are several pieces of information in 
Figure 1. First, the shaded cells represent what Article 13 of the Constitution establishes 
as the proper scope of military jurisdiction.7 Second, each number represents a 
jurisprudential thesis, cited with the same number in the references section of this paper, 
ordered from the most recent (# 1, the “Radilla opinion” not actually a thesis) to the 
oldest thesis in our sample (# 44). Note that the “XXXs” at the bottom represent the 
cases on military jurisdiction decided by the Supreme Court in the summer of 2012. 
Third, the arrows show the general patterns of constitutional jurisprudence: from 1920 to 
1934 when the Court held a narrow scope of military jurisdiction quite consistent with 
Article 13; from 1940 to around 2005 when, the Court established a wider scope of 
military jurisdiction; and from 2005 to 2012 when apparently the court is moving towards 
narrowing the scope of military jurisdiction. It is worth noting the period of 1934 to 1940 
when there were interesting constitutional debates over the proper scope of military 




                                                        
7 See the text of Article 13 in pp. 12-13 below. It is important to note here that the scope of military 
jurisdiction is different but related to another key issue: the degree of autonomy of the military justice vis-á-
vis the ordinary jurisdiction. The degree of autonomy refers to the way in which the judicial process takes 
place within the military jurisdiction, for instance, the duration of proceedings, the composition of the 
military courts, or the determination of their punishments. Notice that the autonomy and scope of military 
jurisdiction are related but different questions. For instance, even in cases that clearly fall under the 
competence of military courts (such as a case of insubordination or desertion) it is important to determine 
autonomy issues such as whether the presiding judge can be an active member of the army because there 
may be concerns that his being active, and usually superior in rank, will violate the principle of neutrality of 
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NOTE: White numbers refer to court cases cited in the references section. White XXXXs refer to the series 
of cases decided during the summer of 2012. The solid arrows refer to jurisprudential general patterns. The 
shaded cells indicate the scope of military jurisdiction according to the Article 13 of the Mexican 
Constitution Article. 
In the reminder of the paper, we present a diachronic analysis of the legal development 
of the scope of military jurisdiction divided into three periods. During each period, we 





















relations, and we discuss the constitutional basis of military jurisdiction. We then give 
account of the Supreme Court’s constitutional-political role focusing on the institutional 
mechanisms for appointment, tenure, removal, and constitutional review powers of the 
judges and their political deontic powers. We then proceed to analyze the corresponding 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudential line on the scope of military jurisdiction. 
III. Supreme Court Justices as Adjudicators: 1917-1934 
III. 1. Political context and civil-military relations 
After years of armed conflict, the Constitutional Congress that convened in Querétaro 
produced the Constitution that since February 5, 1917 is Mexico’s fundamental law. 
Even though the enactment of the Constitution signals the victory of one of the three 
main revolutionary factions with the appointment of Venustiano Carranza as president 
under the new rules of the game, the political scene until 1920 was marked by the 
successive elimination of the revolutionary leaders –Zapata, Villa, and Carranza himself 
who was assassinated on May of that year. A kind of more regular politics after the 
“armed phase” of the revolution is said to start with the administrations of Generals 
Álvaro Obregón (December 1, 1920 to December 1, 1924), and Plutarco Elías Calles 
(1924-1928).  
During the 1920s, however, the multiplicity of political forces continuously threatened to 
derail the already precarious post-revolutionary regime. In this context, the main threat to 
the Obregón administration came from within his own group, with the rebellion of 
General De La Huerta that was successfully repressed in 1923. This paved the way for 
the election of Calles who presided over a period when other rebellions were crushed 
and the Constitution was amended to allow for the reelection of Obregón in 1928, 
assassinated that same year. To channel the diversity of political forces, and in the 
shadow of the assassination of the president elect, General Calles pushed for the creation 
of an umbrella political organization under the name of National Revolutionary Party 
(PNR, 1929), which will become the main vehicle for politics and governance for the 





















To the extent to which the Revolution provided a common ground for both civilian and 
military elites, it contributed indirectly to shape and delimits the role of the armed forces 
(Serrano 1995: 428). Indeed, Obregón and Calles initiated a series of reforms intended to 
reduce the size and budget of the armed forces as well as to make them more 
professional. Both purged the armed forces of rivals, or perceived rivals, by retiring 
hundreds of generals, eliminating others, and bribing the rest. They also cut the budget of 
the armed forces almost in half, but at the same time created the Commission of Military 
Studies (1926) and the Superior School of War (Diez and Nichols 2006: 6-8).8   
III. 2. The Justices’ Constitutional and Political Roles: Adjudicators  
According to the original Constitution of 1917, Supreme Court judges were elected by a 
simple majority of the total members of both houses of Congress out of a list composed 
of one candidate submitted by each state legislature (Art. 96), enjoyed life tenure (i.e. 
“during good behavior”) (Art. 94),9 and could be eventually removed only if a simple 
majority of the house of deputies initiated an impeachment process (Art. 109). The 
Supreme Court was at the top of the judicial power, not only in jurisdictional terms 
through constitutional interpretation and as a court of cassation, but also because it was 
in charge of the appointment of lower court federal judges (Art. 97). 
Regarding the instruments for constitutional review, the Constitution of 1917 included 
the amparo suit, an instrument to protect constitutional rights from government violations 
with inter partes effects, and created the constitutional controversy, an instrument to 
adjudicate conflicts of constitutional competence between branches and levels of 
government (Arts. 103, 105-107). In sum, the constitution established an independent 
Supreme Court with powers to decide over the governmental infringement of individual 
rights, as well as to become the arbiter of political conflicts.10 This constitutional role was 
                                                        
8 Important measures to professionalize and discipline the army, such as the reopening the Military College, 
the practice of rotation, the reduction in the number of troops, and the reorganization of the cavalry and 
infantry corps started actually under Carranza (Serrano 1995: 428). 
9 Article 94 explicitly mentions that tenure during good behavior applies for those judges appointed after 
1923. Those appointed in 1917 had a two-year tenure, and the second cohort had tenure of four years. 
10 However, the role of adjudicator of political conflicts between levels of government was shared with the 






















not threatened by inconsistent deontic powers coming from their political role since, as 
we already explained, the political arena was highly fractionalized.  
III. 3. Jurisprudence on Military Jurisdiction 
When the armed phase of the Mexican Revolution ended in 1920 and some kind of 
regular politics started to operate under a vigorous multiparty system, cases on military 
jurisdiction began to arrive at the Mexican Supreme Court. And the Court consistently 
upheld, in line with Article 13, a narrow scope of military jurisdiction. For instance, in a 
tesis de jurisprudencia11 of 1924, the Court argued that “[…] it is not enough that a crime 
has been committed by a member of the armed forces, because if it does not affect 
military discipline or the armed forces honor, or it was not committed during military 
service, it cannot fall under the jurisdiction of military tribunals” (# 39).  
During those years, the Court also clearly stated that when a civilian is implicated in a 
crime committed with military officials, “[…] the same civil tribunal should decide the 
case, so that it is not split in two courts” (# 42), presumably responding to the litigant´s 
request that the military official should be judged in a military court and the civilian in a 
civil court (cf. Cossío 2010). The Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the scope of 
military jurisdiction, in line with Article 13, was upheld until 1933-1934 (see #33, and 
#35-44). These decisions were not welcomed by members of the armed forces that, as 
shown in the jurisprudential theses, required more autonomy from the political process 
and, in particular, more autonomy for military justice. As we will see, this area of law was 
not the only one in which the Supreme Court was making decisions that were against the 
interests of the “revolutionary family”. 
                                                        
11 Jurisprudential theses (tesis de jurisprudencia) are authoritative interpretations of the constitution emitted by 
the Mexican Supreme Court. The theses are extracted from decisions on specific cases, and they constitute 
the relevant and obligatory interpretative guidelines of the constitution in certain topics. Jurisprudential 
theses are short, law-like paragraphs or sentences, free from both the facts of the case and the legal 
reasoning that made the judges reach that interpretation. This weird system of jurisprudence has its roots in 
Mexico´s hybrid legal system, in place since the XIX Century, which combines features from the anglo 





















IV. The Supreme Court Justices’ as Regime Supporters: 1934-1994 
IV. 1. Political context and civil-military relations 
From 1928 to 1934 Plutarco Elías Calles became the Jefe Máximo de la Revolución, the 
leader of the newly founded PNR who pulled the political strings behind the presidential 
seat. Things changed when General Lázaro Cárdenas, selected by Calles as the PNR 
candidate to the presidency and elected in 1934, maneuvered to expatriate Calles and 
expel the callistas from his government. During the administration of General Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940), the party successfully integrated the army, the organized workers, 
and the organized peasants into its structure and changed its name to Partido de la 
Revolución Mexicana (PRM, 1936). The PRM gradually became the single most important 
political machine in the country within which most decisions regarding “who gets what, 
when, and why” were made. A decade later, the party became hegemonic and changed its 
name to Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, 1946), the same year that the first civilian 
president, Miguel Alemán, was elected.  
Cárdenas’ incorporation of the organized peasants, workers, and the armed forces within 
the PRM secured the stability for the nascent regime but, at the same time, reduced the 
relative power of the army. Despite the resistance of the armed forces (Serrano 1995: 
433), Cárdenas went further and introduced other changes to discipline them such as 
dividing the Ministry of War and Navy into two autonomous defense ministries (the 
Ministry of Defense, which included the Army and the Air Force, and the Ministry of the 
Navy), enacting legislation barring serving officers from participating in any political 
activity, continuing earlier efforts aimed at the professionalization of the forces (Diez and 
Nichols 2006: 9).12 In sum, by the end of the Cárdenas administration, “the Mexican 
armed forces had been weakened and brought under the control of the national party.” 
(Diez and Nichols 2006: 9). 
In exchange of loyalty to the PRM, as well as to the Revolution and to the Revolutionary 
family, the armed forces got an important degree of autonomy in both legal and real 
terms with regard to internal functioning, training, and promotions, along with a high 
                                                        
12 At the same time, Cárdenas passed the Law of National Military Service establishing compulsory basic 





















level of discretion in making expenditures. The exchange of loyalty for autonomy is, in 
essence, what scholars refer to as the “civil-military pact” (e.g. Diez and Nichols 2006: 
10; Serrano 1995: 433). While the basis of the pact was established under Cárdenas, it was 
further developed and sustained in successive administrations. A cornerstone of this 
development was the election of Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) as the first civilian 
president of the PRI.  
Civilian supremacy, however, did not imply that the armed forces lost political influence 
but rather that it was channeled through more subtle mechanisms, and often behind the 
scenes (Ronfeldt 1976, cited in Serrano 1995: 435). In fact, while the president of the 
republic is a civilian since 1946, the president of the PRI was a member of the armed 
forces until 1964, when Carlos A. Madrazo was elected.13  Moreover, since 1940 and until 
1994 “the presence of at least one military officer serving as a Supreme Court justice was 
a constant” (Caballero 2010: 157-8).14  Military officers have also held several seats in 
Congress since 1940 (Diez 2008).  
The armed forces were a key actor in securing internal political order during the “golden 
years” of the PRI regime. Importantly, the armed forces intervened at the behest of 
civilian authorities and always on a temporary basis. This was the case in 1958 when they 
were tasked to suppress a railroad workers’ strike, in 1968 when they were asked to 
intervene against a student movement, and indeed throughout the 1960s when they were 
ordered to put down guerrilla uprisings, especially in the southern state of Guerrero 
(Diez and Nichols 2006: 10). As we will detail in the next section, the basic exchange of 
loyalty for autonomy of the civil-military pact remains until today, but with some 
important changes produced by the increase in non-traditional tasks performed by the 





                                                        
13 The presidents of the PRI in that period were Generals Sánchez Taboada (1946-1952); Gabriel Leyva 
Velázquez (1952-56); Agustín Olachea (1956-1958); and Alfonso Corona del Rosal (1958-1964). Carlos A. 
Madrazo (1964-65) was the first civilian president of the PRI. 
14 “It is noteworthy the case of Agustín Mercado Alarcón who joined the SCJN in 1944 and was there until 






















IV. 2. The Justices’ Role: Regime Supporters 
The constitutional and political roles of the Mexican Supreme Court were drastically 
changed with the emergence of the hegemonic party and the constitutional and political 
changes that it brought with it. As we will see, these changes completely transformed the 
Court’s deontic powers.  
From the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution, circa 1920, until the consolidation of the 
hegemonic party regime, three important reforms –that took place in 1928, 1934, and 
1944– altered the constitutional role of Mexican Justices. These amendments basically 
affected the appointment and tenure of Supreme Court judges, and they had as one of 
their main goals to subordinate the Supreme Court to the dynamics of the one-party 
system. Moreover, they can be understood as a reaction to independent Supreme Court 
decisions during the 1920s that, according to the government, were delaying the 
implementation of the revolutionary program regarding, for instance, the expropriation 
and re-distribution of land (see Marván 2010: 309-311; James 2006). The Supreme Court 
decisions on military jurisdiction were also producing reactions from the armed forces, 
which were also being disciplined and weakened by president Cárdenas. 
In 1928 a constitutional amendment augmented the number of Supreme Court judges 
from eleven to sixteen and modified their method of appointment: instead of exclusive 
congressional appointment by a two thirds vote, the reform gave the president the right 
to propose a candidate, subject to senate ratification. In 1934 another amendment again 
increased the number of judges to twenty one and transformed the original life tenure of 
Justices into a six-year tenure coincident with the presidential administration. Ten years 
later, in 1944, life tenure was restored with an interesting caveat: the President of the 
Republic could initiate proceedings to remove a judge who exhibited “bad behavior”, and 
as we will see, when the tenure was restored the political side of the Justices’ role had 
already changed in a way that guaranteed that they were no longer a threat to the interests 
of the party.  
With the consolidation of the hegemonic party rule, Justices acquired a political role of 
regime supporters. It was an unwritten norm that Justices shared the interests of the 





















positions among which the members of the political elite circulated. Moreover, even with 
the restoration of de jure life tenure, from 1944 to 1994 most presidents appointed more 
than 50% of justices during their terms and almost 40% of the Justices lasted less than 
five years, coming and going according to the presidential term (Magaloni 2003: 288-9; 
see also Caballero 2010). There was therefore an unwritten norm that made the tenure 
provision ineffective.15  
Once the Supreme Court and the rest of the judiciary were successfully incorporated into 
the corporatist logic of the PRI, there was another series of reforms aimed at improving 
the administrative efficacy of the judiciary, both by concentrating administrative power in 
the Supreme Court and by expanding the number of lower federal courts, to deal with 
the ever increasing caseload. Two reforms are noteworthy examples of this trend. First, 
in 1951 a constitutional amendment approved the appointment of auxiliary judges to the 
Supreme Court and also created a new layer of circuit courts with the aim of reducing the 
highest court’s caseload regarding amparo suits,16 namely the cases where an individual 
citizen challenges a state action based on the argument that a public authority had 
violated her constitutionally protected rights (see Caballero 2010: 149-152). In 1968, 
again to overcome the backlog, another reform decided to limit the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction and to transform the collegial circuit courts, which were doubled in 
number, into last courts of appeals for most cases (see Caballero 2009: 166-170). 
The culmination of the series of reforms aimed at improving the administrative efficacy 
of the judiciary took place in 1987 when a constitutional amendment transferred to the 
Supreme Court the power to control the material resources of the judiciary, including not 
only the budget, but also decisions over the number and jurisdiction of courts. These 
new capacities added to the Supreme Court’s control over the appointment and 
promotions of lower court judges, a prerogative that the Court had enjoyed since 1917. 
By the end of the 1980s the Mexican Supreme Court had become a powerful 
administrative body very much involved with the dynamics of hegemonic party that, 
nonetheless, still had relatively weak powers of judicial review through the amparo suit. 
                                                        
15 For a more detailed account of the relation between social and political roles and constitutional inefficacy 
see Pozas-Loyo (2012). 
16 Especially those amparos filed against decisions of local judges, the so-called amparo directo. Amparo is 
sometimes translated as habeas corpus but it encompasses more than what this term implies in English. 





















The reform of 1987, however, by limiting even further the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to “important cases” also signals the beginning of a new series of reforms aiming 
at the empowerment of the Supreme Court as a constitutional tribunal. 17 
IV. 3. Jurisprudence on Military Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court´s jurisprudence on military jurisdiction nicely reflects the 
transformations in the constitutional and political roles of Mexican Justices, in particular 
their loss of independence from the government produced by the reform of 1928, and 
especially that of 1934. The place to start is the code of military justice enacted in 1933 
that in its Article 57 not only considerably expands the list of crimes that can be decided 
in military courts (including, for instance, fraud, robbery, and assault) (González Oropeza 
2006), but also states that military courts have jurisdiction on service-related crimes 
committed by military personnel are to be decided in military courts. The scope of 
military jurisdiction defined in Art. 57 of the code of military justice is, therefore, 
manifestly wider than what Art. 13 of the Constitution stipulate. What did the Mexican 
Supreme Court do? After resisting a bit in erratic jurisprudence from 1934 to 1940, the 
Court interpreted the Constitution in such a way that made the code constitutional. In 
other words, the Court adapted the Constitution to the code, instead of the other way 
around. 
The erratic jurisprudence of the period 1934 to 1940 is interesting. On the one hand, the 
Supreme Court sustained the criteria that when military personnel and civilians are 
involved in a crime a civilian court should decide the case (#33, 23, 37). But by the end 
of the period the Court established a striking criterion: when military men and civilians 
are involved in a crime the former should go to military courts and the latter to civilian 
courts (# 25), even though this clearly violated basic due process (e.g. of equality and 
unity of justice) and created significant trouble in practice. The Court went further in 
expanding the scope of military jurisdiction when it held that civilians could be 
considered capable of committing military crimes (# 27), and that when civilians and 
military men are involved in a crime, but the civilians as the victims not as accomplices, 
the case goes to military courts (#26 and 34). Also, despite the fact that the Supreme 
                                                        
17 There was another important reform in 1982 that takes away from the President the capacity to initiate a 





















Court admitted the military code’s expansion of military jurisdiction to service-related 
crimes, the Court did established some limits to what it meant to be “in service” 
excluding passionate crimes (# 22), and those committed by drunk officers in a bar fight 
(# 24).  
To understand the erratic jurisprudence from 1934 to 1940 it is important to remember 
the political context. As Mónica Serrano puts it, “while it is true that by 1940 the 
possibility of army officers securing control of the party was averted with the withdrawal 
of the military sector, it is also clear that between 1920 and 1940s disagreements and 
differences regarding the selection of party candidates and institutional responsibilities 
continued to challenge the civil-military pact” (Serrano 1995: 433). The conflicts of 
competence between civilian and military courts, and the pressures that both sides 
exerted on the Supreme Court Justices during those years, are nicely reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the period. At that time, the political and constitutional roles of the 
Supreme Court Justices were in transition: from being quite independent judges to 
become functional members of the hegemonic party system since 1940. 
From 1940 onwards  –essentially until 2009, when an important dissenting opinion by a 
Supreme Court judge on military jurisdiction was published– the Mexican Supreme 
Court basically uphold a criteria based on the identity of the person involved in a crime: 
if the person belongs to the armed forces then the case belongs to military jurisdiction. 
The “personal-identity” criterion was somewhat attenuated by sensibly keeping out of 
military courts some conducts and situations that simply cannot be considered part of the 
military service, such as crimes committed while the officer is on vacation (# 11), or 
when a military officer killed the referee during a soccer game (# 12).  But in some cases, 
the Mexican Supreme Court upheld the pure “personal-identity” criterion even in cases 
of rape of a woman (# 13), robbery (#18), or murder of a civilian (Mexico Case # 19). 























V. The Supreme Court Justices as Constitutional Interpreters: 
1994-2012 
V. 1. Political context and civil-military relations 
One of the most interesting features of the PRI was its capacity to remain in power for 
more than seven decades (1929-2000). Through a series of gradual reforms the PRI 
adapted successfully to changing internal and external conditions while simultaneously 
holding on to power. These reforms touched on every issue of the political and social 
system. The electoral reforms since 1977 are the paradigmatic example of constant and 
hard bargaining between the PRI –that did not want to lose much– and opposition forces 
–that needed to gain enough– that made possible the PRIista order for seventy-one years. 
There are three crucial dates in the gradual electoral decline of the PRI: 1988 when the PRI 
lost the two-thirds majority in the lower house and thus the capacity to unilaterally 
change the constitution, 1997 when the PRI lost the majority in the lower house, and 
2000 when it lost the presidency.  
The changing political circumstances since the 1960s, but especially those of the 1970s 
and 1980s, had an impact on civil-military relations. In particular, the several Central 
American crises of the 1980s, the emergence of drug trafficking as a threat to national 
security, and the Chiapas rebellion of 1994 changed the role of the Mexican military as 
they acquired responsibilities well beyond acting as guardians of the regime, and the 
“revolutionary family”. These new responsibilities have been accompanied by a 
corresponding growth in the size of Mexico’s standing army, influence in policy-making, 
especially regarding public security, distortions in the promotions process, and the 
development of military industries (Diez and Nichols 2006: 27; Serrano 1995: 439-442).   
The military’s involvement in combatting drug trafficking has proved particularly 
consequential. This involvement started in the 1970s, but accelerated in the late 1980s 
under the Salinas administration (1988-1994), after he declared drug trafficking to be an 
issue of national security, and continued to grow under presidents Zedillo (1994-2000) 
and Fox (2000-2006). Under the administration of Calderón (2006-2012) it acquired 
tragic proportions. It is possible to trace a parallel increment in the involvement of the 





















administration, for example, “the Drug Control Planning Center (CENDRO), the Federal 
Preventative Police (PFP) and the National Institute to Combat Drugs have been headed 
by military officers, and the Center for National Security and Intelligence—Mexico’s 
intelligence agency—increasingly has been run by the military” (Diez and Nichols 
2006: 33). Perhaps the clearest example of the increased penetration of the armed forces 
into the civil branches of government was the appointment in 2000 of Brigadier General 
Rafael Macedo de la Concha to be Attorney General, the first time in Mexico’s history 
that a military officer has ever served in that office.   
The increased involvement of the military in the antinarcotics campaign has also had a 
huge cost in terms of human rights violations especially under the Calderón 
administration. From 1999 until 2004 the National Human Rights Commission received 
1,069 complaints of abuses perpetrated by the armed forces. In 2008 the number of 
complaints was 1,231 and during the first six months of 2009 the CNHD received more 
than two thousand complaints against the army (figures cited in Diez 2012). The 
Interamerican Court of Human Rights has also decided against Mexico in cases where 
the army is involved in human rights violations, most famously in the Radilla case. In any 
event, the involvement of the armed forces in the “war against drugs” as well as other 
non-traditional activities has been accompanied by increments mostly in size, budget, and 
influence in policy-making, but also by very mild reductions in terms of political 
autonomy.  
Figure 2 displays differences in armed forces´ size, budget (absolute and relative), and 
legitimacy, in six Latin American countries including Mexico. The growth in size of the 
Mexican armed forces since 1970 is constant and impressive, comparable only to that of 
Colombia. Increments in budget for the military in Mexico, however, are modest in 
absolute terms and practically null in relative terms (as % of GDP), while the same is not 
true for Colombia or Brazil that exhibit important increments in this regard. Figure 2 also 
supports the widely held view that the Mexican armed forces enjoy considerable public 
support: by 2007 less than 30% of people had confidence in the military in Argentina and 























Figure II. Armed Forces in Latin Amerca 
 
Autonomy for the armed forces in Mexico, however, has remained at relatively high 
levels. For instance, while Argentina and Brazil have civilians exercise some ministerial 
and budgetary control over the military, this is practically absent in Mexico (Sotomayor 
2007). Uruguay has also made considerable progress in this regard (Fitch 1998: 41). In 
Mexico, the armed forces have continued to operate with significant autonomy and weak 
legislative oversight, especially in the areas of promotions, a process in which civilians 
have not inserted themselves, and the allocation of the internal military budget, a process 
that is still not determined by civilians, despite the prerogatives of the Senate and 
Deputies in each one of these areas, respectively (Diez 2008, 2012). In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that a restriction for the autonomy, in particular limiting the scope of military 
jurisdiction, came from the decisions by the Supreme Court in 2010, and especially those 
























V. 2. The Justices’ constitutional and political roles: enabling constitutional 
interpretation 
The key constitutional reform in this period took place in 1994 when the Supreme Court 
was delegated considerable powers of judicial review and its membership was reduced 
and renewed in order to increase its legitimacy and independence vis-à-vis the other 
branches of government (see, e.g., Fix-Fierro 2003). The 1994 reform substantially 
increased the judicial review powers of the Mexican Supreme Court by creating 
instruments of both concrete and abstract control with the possibility of generating erga 
omnes effects and it granted Justices an effective fifteen-year tenure. These changes 
transformed the constitutional role of Mexican Justices given them new and powerful 
deontic capacities and, as we will see, gave them the possibility of becoming at times 
constitutional interpreters.  
Moreover, most of the judges proposed in 1995 by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate were the product of consensus between at least two political parties, the PRI and 
the right-leaning PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) (Magaloni et al. 2011). This and the other 
political transformations of the party system mentioned above transformed the political 
role of Justices: little by little many of the unwritten political norms of the PRI era became 
ineffective, and new political norms of a multiparty system have started to emerge. 
It is important to mention that access to the two new instruments of constitutional 
review created or strengthened in 1994 (the action of unconstitutionality and the 
constitutional controversy, respectively) was allowed only to political authorities such as 
political parties, the representatives of the three branches of government, or a legislative 
minority. Ordinary citizens do not have standing to use these instruments, and this is also 
true for most autonomous organs such as the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) or the 
Federal Institute of Transparency and Information (IFAI). Moreover, the other 
instrument for constitutional review, the amparo suit, was not only weak mainly because 
of its limited, inter-partes, effects, but also its de facto inaccessibility for ordinary citizens 
because throughout the years it had become technically complex and quite expensive. 
It is also noteworthy that the reform of 1994 also created a judicial council that was 





















both in terms of the administration of the judiciary’s budget and also in terms of the 
appointment of judges and the management of their careers. The political motives 
behind the creation of the council were, first, to make the constitutional jurisdiction the 
special focus of the Supreme Court, and second, to reduce the Supreme Court’s 
corporatist management of judicial careers. According to former Justice Jorge Carpizo, 
Supreme Court judges used to take turns to fill a vacancy at any level of the judiciary, and 
the new judge’s career was overseen by his “mentor” on the court, so that after some 
time each Supreme Court judge had his own loyal clientele within the judiciary (Carpizo 
2000). Also, Supreme Court judges protected unprofessional and dishonest judges whom 
they had mentored, reasoning that public scandals damaged the reputation of the entire 
judiciary.    
The judicial council was originally composed by a majority of judges selected by lottery, a 
method that effectively took away from the Supreme Court the control over lower court 
judges and over the material resources of the judiciary. The Supreme Court did not like 
this and it started to lobby strongly in order to regain control over the administration of 
the judiciary and the administration of the judicial career (see Fix-Fierro 2003; Carpizo 
2000). The pressure was successful: in 1999, after four years of an interesting battle 
between the council and the Supreme Court a constitutional amendment changed the 
mechanisms to appoint judicial council members (see Pozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa 
2011). In essence, the amendment transformed the selection by lot of judges from 
different levels into a direct designation by the Supreme Court of judges from the district 
and circuit courts. This effectively gave the Supreme Court control over the majority of 
seats in the Council, which automatically gave back to it control over the material 
resources of the judiciary and the careers of lower court judges.   
In sum, since 1999 the justice system concentrates a lot of power on the Supreme Court, 
an institution that dominates the system combining functions of constitutional tribunal, 
last court of appeals, court of cassation, and administrator. Nowadays the Constitution 
gives Justices the possibility of becoming true constitutional interpreters: their 
instruments of judicial review, their relatively high independence, their power to attract 
cases deemed “transcendent and important”, and their capacity to oversee lower courts 





















However, as we have said, access to constitutional litigation is still very restrictive and 
Justices are also the head of the administration of material and human resources of the 
whole judiciary (indirectly, via its influence over the judicial council). These features of 
the Justices’ constitutional role and the difficult and long-lasting process of shaping a 
new political role for a multiparty system have arguably delayed the efficacy of the role of 
constitutional interpreter. In the issue of the scope of military jurisdiction, constitutional 
interpretation began to crystalize in 2009 as we will now see.  
V. 3. Jurisprudence on military jurisdiction 
The political changes in 1997, when for the first time in decades the PRI lost a majority in 
the Chamber of Deputies, and 2000 when the PRI lost for the first time in seventy-one 
years the executive power, have had some effects on Mexican Supreme Court decisions 
(e.g. Rios-Figueroa 1997; Sánchez et al. 2011). However, regarding military jurisdiction 
the Court mostly kept a deferential silence, with the exception of some mild restrictions 
on what is considered military crimes for military jurisdiction (Mexico Cases #2, 3). 
During more than a decade after the reform of 1994, the most important decisions of the 
Mexican Supreme Court regarding military justice were a handful of jurisprudential 
theses on the autonomy of the military jurisdiction on procedural matters, and a 
consequential 1996 decision where the Court upheld the constitutionality of military 
participation in matters of internal public security (Carbonell 2002; Pedroza 2011).  
Things began to change in 2009 when Justice José Ramón Cossío published an important 
dissenting opinion in a case known as “Reynalda Morales”. The case is named after the 
woman who filed an amparo suit against a lower court that granted jurisdiction to a 
military tribunal over a case related to her husband’s death by military officers. The 
Mexican Supreme Court dismissed the amparo arguing that Ms. Morales lacked the 
“juridical interest” in this case required to file an amparo suit. Justice Cossío published a 
dissenting opinion in which he basically argues for the unconstitutionality of Article 57 of 
the code of military justice and proposes a radical jurisprudential change on military 
jurisdiction. The importance of this dissenting opinion lies in the fact of its close 
resemblance with a recent opinion by the Mexican Supreme Court (# 1), where the scope 
of military jurisdiction is interpreted in very narrow terms (the so-called “Radilla 





















agreeing with the holding by the Interamerican Court of Human Rights (ICHR) that 
pointed to, among other things, the unconstitutionality of Article 57 of the code of 
military justice.  
During the summer of 2012 the Mexican Supreme Court issued a series of decisions (# 
XXX) upholding and even extending its holding in Radilla, arguing that cases of human 
rights violations do not belong to military courts, and started to delimit the type of 
crimes that can properly be heard in military courts. Let us focus on the case of Bonfilio 
Rubio (AR 133/2012).  Bonfilio was killed by members of the armed forces in a military 
checkpoint in the state of Guerrero in June 2009. The military jurisdiction attracted the 
case but Bonfilio’s relatives, his father and brother, with the assistance of some non-
governmental organizations filed an amparo suit arguing that the case should be heard in 
an ordinary criminal court. The amparo was granted, the Ministry of Defense appealed 
this decision, and the case reached the Supreme Court.  
The first interesting point is that, in contrast to holding in Radilla, the Supreme Court did 
not argue that Bonfilio’s relative lacked “juridical interest” and thus did not dismissed the 
amparo (although a couple of Justices argued that it should have been dismissed on those 
procedural grounds). Moreover, the court granted the amparo and decided that Bonfilio’s 
case should be decided by a regular criminal court. But perhaps more importantly, in its 
decision the court declared unconstitutional parts of Article 57 of the Code of Military 
Justice, as it had already established in the Radilla opinion but this time with a real case 
with jurisprudential value. The Bonfilio case, therefore, closes a long history that started 
during the 1930s when the Supreme Court almost magically interpreted the Constitution 
in light of the Code of Military Justice.  
Interestingly, during April and July of 2011, that is to say in between the Radilla and the 
Bonfilio cases yet another couple of important constitutional reforms that directly affect 
the Supreme Court were approved in Mexico. The first reform transforms the human 
rights regime in the country.  First, it expands the catalogue of justiciable rights: the 
reform introduces in the constitution the term “human rights” instead of “individual 
guarantees”, which is not merely a linguistic change because whereas “individual 
guarantees” are located in the first 29 articles of the constitution “human rights” can be 





















While the reform of human rights is important in itself, its potential was considerably 
augmented by the simultaneous reform of the Amparo suit: the individual instrument of 
constitutional complaints that is the main legal tool for rights protection in Mexico. This 
reform expands the accessibility, scope, and applicability of the amparo. Contrary to the 
old amparo that was accessible only for someone with a “juridical interest” in a case 
(someone directly affected by a public authority), the new amparo will be accessible for 
anyone with a “legitimate interest”, and it will be useful for filing so-called acciones 
colectivas, which are similar to class actions. Contrary to the old amparo that was only useful 
for challenging governmental acts allegedly violating one of the “constitutional 
guarantees” present in the first twenty nine articles of the constitution, the new amparo 
will be useful for challenging government acts that violate any human right recognized by 
the constitution or by international treaties. Last but not least, contrary to the old amparo 
that produced only inter partes effects, decisions in at least some new amparo cases will be 
applicable to greater number of people.  
The Supreme Court in the Bonfilio case clearly was influenced by the human rights and 
the amparo reforms. Whether these recent reforms actually produce a broader “rights 
revolution” in the country remains to be seen. On the one hand, some studies have 
documented a prudent but consistent change since about 2005 in the jurisprudence of 
the Mexican Supreme Court favoring the protection of, for instance, the right to privacy, 
some criminal due process rights, and the right to health (e.g. Madrazo and Vela 2011; 
Pou 2011; Magaloni and Ibarra 2008). Moreover, at least in theoretical terms the reforms 
have the potential to produce a surge in rights litigation and a transformation of the 
judicial landscape: studies on Costa Rica and Colombia (e.g. Wilson and Rodríguez 
Cordero, 2006) argue that expanding access produces a rights revolution even in 
countries lacking a strong “support structure” (Epp 1998). Karina Ansolabehere (2009) 
has found that the Colombian Constitutional Court is much more active protecting rights 
than the Mexican Supreme Court in great part because of ease of access to justice in the 
former country and its difficulty in the latter. 
However, there are at least two notes for caution. First, the effects of the reforms will 
depend on how creatively and extensively litigants use the new amparo and how 
expansively judges interpret the “legitimate interest” standing in these suits. Of course, 
both the litigants’ and the judges’ decisions will be shaped by the governmental reactions 





















start, but the doctrine on standing is still being developed. A second note of caution is 
that the recent reforms can combine in virtuous or vicious ways. If lawyers use creatively 
the new amparo, the judges welcome the new flow of cases and human rights arguments, 
and the criminal process reform starts to generate better prosecutorial and police 
practices then there will be motives to celebrate. But if, for instance, lawyers use 
creatively the new amparo, judges welcome the flow of cases and arguments, but the 
prosecutorial, police, and the armed forces’ practices do not improve then a “juridical 
perfect storm” may be in the horizon.   
VI. Conclusion  
We argued that the dual legal/political nature of the Supreme Court should be analyzed, 
to the extent possible, from the perspective of the legal scholarship and the perspective 
of the social sciences simultaneously. We proposed a theoretical framework, grounded on 
the notion of role, which enables this type of accounts. We defined and used the notions 
of “constitutional role” and of “political role”. Our empirical research had a diachronic 
structure, and we focused on a single issue: the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the 
scope of the military jurisdiction from 1917 to 2012. Our analysis identified three periods 
in which the Justices’ political and constitutional roles changed in an important way, as 
did their response to the military jurisdiction question. We chose this question because it 
is a relatively small but privileged window from which to observe the dual legal/political 
nature of the Supreme Court.  
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